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Abstract
This paper explores the e¤ects of capital controls and policies regulating in-
terest rates and the exchange rate in a model of economic transition applied to
China. We build on Song et al. (2011) who construct a growth model consistent
with salient features of the recent Chinese growth experience: high output growth,
sustained returns on capital investment, extensive reallocation within the manu-
facturing sector, sluggish wage growth, and accumulation of a large trade surplus.
The salient features of the theory are asymmetric nancial imperfections and het-
erogeneous productivity across private and state-owned rms. Capital controls
and regulation of banksdeposit rates stie competition in the banking sector and
hamper the lending to productive private rms. Removing such regulation would
accelerate the growth in productivity and output. A temporarily undervalued ex-
change rate reduces real wages and consumption, stimulating investments in the
high-productivity entrepreneurial sector. This fosters productivity growth and a
trade surplus. A high interest rate mitgates the disadvantage of nancially con-
strained rms, reduces wages, and increases the speed of transition from low- to
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1 Introduction
Economic theory predicts that capital should ow towards countries, regions and rms
where it commands the highest returns. Yet, this prediction is contradicted by the data:
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) document that, within non-OECD economies, capital
inows are negatively correlated with productivity and output growth. On average,
capital does not ow to the countries that o¤er the best investment opportunities. This
observation has been labeled the allocation puzzle. Due to its size and to the large
current account surpluses it has run over the last 15 years, China is a fundamental piece
of this puzzle. In spite of the high return to real investment, China has been a large
capital exporter, amassing reserves amounting to almost 4 trillion USD in the end of
rst quarter of 2014.1
In Song et al. (2011), henceforth SSZ, we document that a version of the alloca-
tion puzzle is also found within China (see also Cudrè 2014). Regions and rms where
capital commands the highest returns fail to attract nancial resources. For instance,
the gap between savings and investment is positively correlated with productivity at
the provincial level. SSZ proposes a structural explanation for this pattern, and for the
associated accumulation of foreign reserves. The predictions of our theory are consis-
tent with some salient stylized facts about Chinas economy since 1992: high output
growth, sustained returns on capital investments, an extensive reallocation within the
manufacturing sector, and sluggish wage growth.
The building blocks of the theory are asymmetric nancial imperfections and di¤er-
ences in productivity across rms. More specically, we construct a competitive economy
populated by two sets of rms. The former have access to more productive technologies,
but are subject to tighter nancial constraints. In a frictionless environment, the less
productive rms would be driven out by competition. However, these can survive, thanks
to their better access to credit markets. The credit market imperfections constrain the
growth of the more productive rms, whose investments must be nanced largely from
retained earnings. Thus, the demise of the less productive sector is gradual. During the
1Caselli and Feyrer (2007) argue that a properly measured return to capital is approximately equal-
ized across a sample of countries which excludes China. Their main point is that one should correct
for di¤erences in the relative price of capital when calculating its rate of return. The Bai et al. (2007)
estimate of the rate of return on capital for China includes such an adjustment, and nds that China
has a signicantly higher rate of return on capital than most countries. See Bai et al. (2007), p.65.
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transition, the high-productivity rms outgrow the low-productivity rms and attract
an increasing employment share. The downsizing of the low-productivity rms implies
that a growing share of domestic savings will be invested in foreign assets, generating a
trade surplus.2
SSZ assumes, for simplicity, a laissez-faire environment, with the government playing
no active role in setting the exchange rate, interest rate, etc. In reality, the Chinese
government uses a variety of policy instruments that a¤ect prices and resource allocation.
For instance, capital controls, interest rate regulations and reserve requirements have
been pervasive (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo¤2005). In addition, while China has been a
very open economy to international trade and to inward foreign direct investments, cross-
border portfolio ows have been subject to tight regulations. Chinese private investors
cannot trade in foreign assets, nor can foreign investors access Chinese nancial markets.
The RMB today is convertible only for trade transactions. There are exemptions, as
we document below, but these are still limited. The gross cross-border ow of assets is
still moderate, relative to Chinas GDP. China is in this sense similar to the other large
emerging economies (Gourinchas and Rey 2013).
In this paper, we study how capital controls and regulations of the nancial system
a¤ect key measures of economic performance, such as wage growth, productivity growth,
and trade surplus. To this end, we extend the SSZ model to incorporate explicitly a
range of nancial market regulations: controls of deposit and lending rates, restrictions
over cross-border nancial investments, interest rate and exchange rate policies. We also
evaluate the welfare e¤ects of such policies.
The model economy is a non-monetary small "semi-open economy" where consumers
demand two goods, one produced by domestic rms and one produced abroad. As in
SSZ there are pervasive frictions in the domestic economy. The more productive rms
are credit constrained, while the less productive rms have access to external (bank)
nancing. Due to capital controls, domestic savers, rms, and banks cannot access the
international credit market. Nor are foreign agents allowed to hold any domestic assets.
Only the government (e.g., through the central bank) can hold positive or negative debt
positions versus the rest of the world, matching trade ow imbalances. In this sense the
economy is semi-open, as in previous work by Jeanne (2012), and Bacchetta et al. (2013
2An implication of this view is that nancial reforms enabling entrepreneurs to borrow more would
reduce the trade surplus. However, this conclusion depends on the details of the model. Martin and
Ventura (2012) show that the e¤ect of a nancial reform on the trade surplus hinges on two opposing
forces  the additional investments of high-productivity rms versus the resources released by low-
productivity rms.
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and 2014).
We use this model to study the e¤ect of a number of policies inuencing nancial
markets. First, the government xes the relative price at which domestic goods are
traded for foreign goods (i.e., the real exchange rate). This policy is implemented through
a restriction on the market access for foreign exporters, which we label this as the
(real) exchange rate policy (ERP). The main focus here is on the case of a temporarily
undervalued exchange rate, which is relevant for the debate about China. Namely,
the government makes foreign goods articially more expensive relative to home goods.
Second, the government sets the interest rate on domestic government bonds, and issues
domestic bonds so as to meet the demand at that rate. We label this as the interest
rate policy (IRP). Third, the government regulates the spread between the deposit and
lending rates o¤ered by domestic banks by imposing a ceiling on the interest rates banks
can o¤er to depositors. We label this as the deposit rate policy (DRP). This regulation
inuences competition in the banking sector. Since banks are not allowed to compete
in o¤ering better conditions to borrowers and lenders, the muted competition among
banks creates an incumbency advantage. In China incumbent banks are state-owned,
and are, as we document in SSZ, biased against nancing private enterprises. This
barrier to entry has potentially important implications for the e¢ ciency of the banking
sector and, ultimately, aggregate productivity. As we discuss below, the government is
currently deregulating the banking industry. We use our theory to explore the e¤ect of
this regulation. Finally, we consider the e¤ect of full nancial deregulation: removing
all restrictions on cross-border ows, interest rates and exchange rates.
Consider, rst, the ERP. An undervalued exchange rate decreases the demand for
foreign goods, and reduces real wages. Since the ERP is assumed to be temporary, this
generates in addition an intertemporal substitution in consumption, fostering savings at
the expenses of consumption, a mechanism similar to that emphasized by Dornbusch
(1983).3 Thus, an undervalued exchange rate increases the savings gap, resulting in
a trade surplus and accumulation of foreign reserves. Interestingly, this policy also
a¤ects the speed of transition, since it increases the savings and investments of private
entrepreneurs. Thus, the theory predicts that an undervalued exchange rate would, as
often argued in the policy debate, decrease consumption and generate a trade surplus,
even in the absence of any nominal rigidities. Over time, the exchange rate policy
3He argues that if the relative price of the domestic consumption basket is changing over time,
this is equivalent to a change in the e¤ective real domestic interest rate. For instance, a temporarily
undervalued exchange rate corresponds to an increase in the domestic interest rate, which in turn leads
consumers to save more today to raise future relative to current consumption.
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speeds up the accumulation of entrepreneurial capital, thereby accelerating TFP and
economic growth. This trade-o¤between static losses and dynamic gains of the exchange
rate policy are reminiscent of that emphasized by the mercantilist export-led-growth
view (see, e.g., Korinek and Servén 2010, and Rodrik 2009). However, these authors
emphasize the role of dynamic externalities in manufacturing (as in Lucas 1988) or,
more specically, in the export sector. While this complementary mechanism might be
important in reality, our mechanism does not hinge on any such externality.
Consider, next, the IRP. In a standard model, a low interest rate has an expansionary
e¤ect by lowering the borrowing cost for investing rms. In our model the real interest
rate has an additional general equilibrium e¤ect (one that is absent in the case of the
ERP): it distorts the allocation of resources between private and state-owned rms.
Namely, when the banks lending rate is low, nancially unconstrained state-owned
rms increase their capital-labor ratios. This increases the equilibrium wage rate. In
turn, high wages reduce the protability of nancially constrained rms, slowing down
capital accumulation in the entrepreneurial sector, and hence, hampering the transition
from low-productivity to high-productivity rms. Therefore, a low interest rate has on
the one hand an expansionary e¤ect (through both higher wages increasing aggregate
consumption, and higher investments of nancially integrated rms). On the other hand,
it reduces productivity growth and hampers reallocation, reducing economic growth.
One should also note that a low interest rate decreases the trade surplus. This is per se
not surprising, although the channel in our theory is di¤erent from the standard ones.
Both the ERP and IRP have non-trivial distributional e¤ects. An undervalued ex-
change rate hurts the early generations of both workers and entrepreneurs, due to the
distortion of consumption. Yet, the future generations of workers and entrepreneurs gain
from this policy, as larger investments trigger the earlier onset of fast wage growth. As
far as the IRP is concerned, while a high interest rate hurts early generations of workers
through low wages, it benets future generations of workers (possibly, far in time) by
speeding up transition.
Finally, consider the DRP. This is an especially topical policy; until July 2013, Chi-
nese banks could compete neither in the loan market (by o¤ering lower interest rates
to borrowers) nor in the deposit market (by o¤ering higher interest rate to depositors).
Ceilings on deposit rates are still in place as we write, although the Peoples Bank of
China (PBOC) has recently announced its intention to lift them, too. We focus on the
e¤ect of removing the ceilings on deposit rates. We nd two main results. First, if
there is no heterogeneity between incumbent and potential new banks, then the deposit
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rate deregulation has no e¤ect over and above increasing the rate of return earned by
depositors. In this case, the deregulation would increase consumption of the old and
reduce the trade surplus slightly, without any e¤ect on productivity. Deregulation has
a farther-reaching e¤ect if the increasing competition in the banking industry triggers
the entry of new banks that are less entrenched with state-owned enterprises, and hence
more prone to lend to the most productive private rms. In this case, deregulation will
ultimately increase access to external nancing for high-productivity rms owned by
private entrepreneurs. This speeds up reallocation and productivity growth and reduces
the trade surplus.
The article is structured as follows: In section 2, we describe the main aspects of the
Chinese policies (capital controls, interest rate controls, etc.) over the last two decades.
In section 3 we present the model. Section 4 investigate the exchange rate- and interest
rate policy experiments. Section 5 studies the e¤ect of reforming the nancial market
system. Section 6 concludes.
2 Facts
In this section, we present two sets of empirical facts. We rst document the dynamics
of foreign reserves, exchange rates, capital controls, and capital ows. We then describe
how monetary policy has been conducted over the last two decades. The aim is to
provide a set of stylized facts upon which we will base the theoretical discussion in the
subsequent sections of the paper.
2.1 Foreign Reserves and Exchange Rates
China transformed its dual-track exchange rate system into a semi-pegged regime in
1994. Panel A of Figure 1 plots the dynamics of nominal and real exchange rates between
RMB and USD, along with the real e¤ective exchange rate (REER) published by the
IMF. The initial values are normalized to 100. A lower exchange rate corresponds to
RMB appreciation. After an initial sharp appreciation, mainly caused by high ination
in China between 1994 and 1996, follows a period of real depreciation of the exchange
rate between 1998 and 2005, then a period of real appreciation thereafter. Since the
nominal exchange rate versus the USD remained xed between 1996 and 2005, the real
depreciation was driven by Chinas low ination relative to its trading partners. Since
2005, the central bank of China has allowed an appreciation of the nominal exchange
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Figure 1: The dotted and solid lines in Panel A plot quarterly nominal and real exchange
rates between RMB and USD, respectively. The dashed line is the real e¤ective exchange
rate. We use ination rates in China and the US to compute real exchange rates. The
initial rates are normalized to 100. The dashed and solid lines in Panel B plot annual
real e¤ective exchange rate and surplus GDP ratio (%), respectively.
rate, resulting in a signicant real appreciation. Note that the dynamics of the REER
are very similar to those of the real exchange rate vis-à-vis the USD.
Panel B of Figure 1 plots the dynamics of trade surplus (as a share of GDP) vs. the
REER. Since 1997, China has run large trade surpluses. The graph illustrates that the
trade surplus dynamics are negatively correlated with the real exchange rates until the
global nancial crisis. In particular, the trade surplus grew strongly during the periods
1994-1997 and 2004-2008, and the REER appreciated during these time periods. More-
over, the trade surplus fell over the 1998-2004 period, when Chinas REER depreciated.4
Although it cannot be given a causal interpretation, this time-series correlation suggests
that changes in trade surplus do not coincide with the depreciation of the RMB, but
rather the opposite, counter to the view that the currency undervaluation is a major
cause of the trade surplus.
The persistent trade surpluses have given rise to an exceptional accumulation of
foreign reserves, dened as foreign bonds and currency held by the Chinese central
bank. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio (solid blue
4During the nancial crisis this relationship appears to have been broken. After 2008 we see a fall in
the trade suplus during a time of a minor appreciation. However, it is hardly surprising to see a lower
trade surplus during the nancial crisis, since this period was characterized by a dramatic fall in global
trade, combined with extraordinary scal stimulus by the Chinese government.
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Figure 2: This gure plots foreign reserves (solid line), di¤erence between bank deposits
and loans (dotted line) and net foreign assets (dashed line), all in percentage of GDP.
line), the net international investment position relative to GDP (black dashed line), and
the di¤erence between deposit and loans in the domestic Chinese banks, also measured
as a percentage of GDP (dotted red line).5 The key observation is that the accumulation
of foreign reserves reects a growing domestic savings gap.
2.2 Capital Controls
Capital ows to and from China are subject to pervasive controls. Indeed, while the
RMB has been fully convertible for current account transactions since 1996, the Chinese
government has retained strong controls on the capital accounts. Controls are exercised
mainly by restricting international portfolio investments, though there are also some
restrictions on direct investment.6 Consequently, portfolio investment ows in and out
of China are rather small, as seen in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 reports Chinas annual
inward and outward investment ows since 2005. The total inward portfolio investment,
5Figure 2 is an updated version of Figure 1 in SSZ, where the data end in 2007. Two observations are
worth mentioning. First, Chinas foreign reserves continue to grow, rising from 1.9 trillion USD in 2007
to 3.2 trillion USD by the end of 2011. Unlike the pattern before 2007 when foreign reserves tended to
outgrow GDP, foregin reserves and GDP have almost the same growth rate, leaving the foreign reserves
GDP ratio roughly unchanged (43 and 44 percent for 2007 and 2011, respectively). Second, foreign
reserves and the di¤erence between bank deposits and loans continue to move in tandem, attesting to a
key prediction of SSZ that Chinas surplus is essentially driven by the declining demand for funds from
nancially integrated domestic rms.
6For instance, foreign direct investment in the service sector is more heavily regulated than in
manufacturing. See Table 1 in Shu et al. (2008) for more detailed description on capital controls in
China.
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for instance, is merely 16 percent of the total inward direct investment. Table 2 compares
Chinas direct and portfolio investment positions with those of the group of countries
with the highest degree of capital account liberalization. Foreign direct investment
into China (inward direct investments) as a share of Chinas GDP is 25 percent, which
is not far from the average level in the countries with open capital accounts (i.e., 33
percent). However, Table 2 shows that the inward and outward portfolio positions
and Chinas direct investments abroad (outward direct investments) are an order of
magnitude smaller than their counterpart gures in countries with open capital accounts.
One way to assess how e¤ective the capital controls are in practice, is to evaluate if
there are deviations from covered interest rate parity (CIP henceforth). In other words,
we can assess whether the di¤erence between the forward rate and the spot rate of two
currencies is equal to the nominal interest rate di¤erence. A deviation would imply
that there are arbitrage opportunities, unless there are capital controls preventing these.
Naturally, CIP holds in economies with developed nancial markets and open capital
accounts. However, Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008) and Shu et al. (2008) nd that in
the case of China, there were signicant deviations from CIP between 1999 and 2007.
This proves that capital controls have been binding and have restricted portfolio ows.
In summary, capital controls appear to be highly asymmetric in China, with limited
barriers to direct investments but tight controls on portfolio investments.
Table 1: Inward and Outward Direct and Portfolio Investments (billion USD)
Inward Investment Outward Investment
Direct Portfolio Direct Portfolio
2005 103 20 12 25
2006 143 44 26 148
2007 89 26 25 19
2008 212 21 70 -32
2009 399 22 60 -10
2010 255 34 71 14
2011 337 25 108 -53
2012 253 88 78 36
Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchange (www.safe.gov.cn).
Table 2: International Investment Positions (% of GDP)
Direct Portfolio
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
China 2010 5.3 25.1 4.4 3.8
Class-D Countries, averaged over 1995-2009 36.3 32.6 51.8 54.2
8
Source: He et al. (2012). Class-D countries refer to the countries with the highest degree
of capital account liberalization.
A partial liberalization has taken place over the past decade. For instance, until
2002 foreign investors were prohibited from trading RMB-denominated nancial assets in
China. Since then, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee has allowed qualied
foreign institutional investors(QFIIs) to buy Chinese stocks and bonds. By the end of
2012, 206 QFIIs were approved, with an investment quota of 41 billion USD in total.7
The number of QFIIs increased by more than half in 2012, jumping from 134 to 206,
indicating an acceleration in the process of liberalizing capital controls. This can also be
seen from Table 1, which shows that inward portfolio investment more than doubled
between 2011 and 2012. Although non-bank Chinese residents and institutions are
still barred from purchasing foreign securities directly, the government has softened the
restriction since 2006 by allowing qualied domestic institutional investors(QDIIs) to
invest in foreign capital markets. Despite an initial boom (Table 1 shows that outward
portfolio investment saw a six-fold increase between 2005 and 2006), outward portfolio
investments have remains altogether modest.8
China is currently considering a drastic reform of the regulation of cross-border port-
folio investments, i.e., opening its capital account. The Peoples Bank of China (PBOC),
with the endorsement of Chinas State Council, is committed to achieving some limited
capital account opening by 2015, and a complete liberalization by 2020. This would
include the full convertibility of the RMB. The milestones of the process remain largely
unknown. It is likely that the rst measures will include further extensions of the existing
qualied investor programs. Aside from the details of its implementation, this reform
has far-reaching implications. First, by allowing domestic investors to take positions in
foreign currencies, it will enable China to improve the management of its foreign asset
portfolio, currently held disproportionately in the form of low-yield government bonds.
Second, foreign investors will be able to purchase equity and corporate bonds issued
by Chinese companies. This may open new nancing opportunities for Chinese real
investors, freeing them from the yoke of the large state-owned Chinese banks.
7Data source: Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee (http://www.cbrc.gov.cn). See also
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/china-investment-qi-idUSL3N0CI10A20130409
8See Yao and Wang (2012) for more details.
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2.3 Interest Rate Policies
The Peoples Bank of China (PBOC henceforth) has been Chinas central bank since
1983. According to the Law of the Peoples Republic of China on the PBOC enacted in
1995, the aim of monetary policies is to maintain the stability of the value of currency
and thereby promote economic growth(Article 3). Although the PBOC has never been
explicit about its monetary policy framework, it is widely believed that the growth rates
of reserve money, M2 and bank credit are its main targets (e.g., OECD, 2010). The main
monetary policy instruments include retail interest rate regulation, reserve requirements
adjustment and open market operations. Less transparent administrative practices such
as window guidanceon bank lending also are used.9
Retail interest rates are heavily regulated, though some of the restrictions have been
relaxed since the late 1990s. The central bank imposes an upper bound on deposit
rates and a lower bound on lending rates. The ceiling for the deposit rate used to be
the benchmark rate itself. In 2012 this bound was relaxed to 10 percent above the
benchmark rate. Similarly, the oor of lending rate is 10 percent below its benchmark
rate, with an exception for the mortgage rate which is allowed to be 30% below the
benchmark rate.10 The ceiling on deposit rate are generally binding. The actual average
lending rates are above the oor (Porter and Xu, 2009), though the di¤erence is not
large.11
The tight regulation of interest rates on deposits and loans has stied competition
in the banking industry. Potential competitors have been prevented from o¤ering better
conditions to attract borrowers and lenders. This setting has preserved a strong market
power for the four major banks. Moreover, the capital controls and nancial restrictions
make it di¢ cult for banks to obtain other sources of nancing than bank deposits. The
ceiling on deposit rates is, therefore, a key policy constraint that prevents private banks
from acquiring larger market shares. The situation is currently changing, though, and
the current Chinese government led by Li Keqiang has taken some partial liberalization
measures. In July 2013, the PBOC scrapped the oor on lending rates, allowing banks
9Window guidance is a practice used extensively by other central banks, most notably, the Bank
of Japan. In China, the PBOC uses window guidance to adjust quantitatively new bank loans. The
e¤ectiveness of window guidance is primarily based on the fact that Chinas Communist Party controls
personnel decisions on top leaders of all state-owned commercial banks. See Geiger (2006) for a more
detailed description of this system.
10The average one-year loan rate from 1994 through 2012 is 7.0 percent. The average oor of the
one-year loan rate is, thus, 6.3 percent, i.e., 70 basis points below the average benchmark rate.
11For instance, the share of loans with lending rates more than 30% above benchmark rates is less
than 20% in most periods (He and Wang, 2012).
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Figure 3: Panel A of this gure plots the one-year benchmark deposit rate (dashed line)
and lending rate (dotted line), and the three-month T bill rate (solid line). Panel B
plots the corresponding real interest rates, measured by the di¤erence between nominal
interest rate and ination rate.
to compete in o¤ering cheap loans to attract the best projects. Then, in August 2013,
the PBOC announced its intention to liberalize the interest rates on deposits in the near
future.
Figure 3 plots the nominal and real one-year benchmark deposit rate (dashed lines)
and lending rate (dotted lines) dictated by the government. We also include the three-
month US T-bill rate as a measure of the world interest rate (solid lines). The rst
observation is that Chinas real deposit and lending rates move closely with the real
world interest rate, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.89 from 1998 through 2012. More
importantly, the real deposit rate in China is slightly higher on average than its US
counterpart in most periods since 1998. The average real deposit rate is 0.91% from
1998 through 2012, while the average US real interest rate is virtually equal to zero
(-0.01%). The real interest rate gap has been widening recently, reaching an average of
1.88 percentage points in 2011 and 2012.12
In addition to regulating banks interest rates, the PBOC has been adjusting the
reserve requirements. Until 2006, the Required Reserve ratio was essentially at at 7
12This is in line with the PBOCs claim that it has been implementing prudentmonetary policies
since 2009. See the lecture that Xiaochuan Zhou, the governor of PBoC, prepared for the Per Jacobsson
Foundation. http://topics.caixin.com/zxc/
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Figure 4: Panel A of this gure plots the required reserve ratio for large nancial insti-
tutions (solid line and left axis) and one-year deposit rate (dotted line and right axis).
The solid and dotted lines in Panel B plot the required reserves ratios for large nancial
institutions and actual reserve ratios of all nancial institutions, respectively.
percent, and was gradually increased to 20 percent by 2012. The timing of the changes in
the reserve requirement seems to coincide with the timing of the changes in the nominal
deposit rate (Panel A of Figure 4).
Since 1994, Chinas bank deposits have been outgrowing bank loans. The di¤er-
ence between aggregate deposits and aggregate bank loans has tracked fairly closely the
growth in the central banks foreign reserves (see Figure 2). Even though the reserve
requirement might have been binding for some individual banks during this period, the
average reserves kept by banks have, on average, been substantially larger than the re-
quired reserve ratio (Panel B of Figure 4). However, by the end of 2007, the required
reserve ratio seems to have caught up with the actual reserves held by banks. For ex-
ample, in 2008 the average reserves were just 2.6 percentage points above the required
reserve ratio.13
Sterilization through open market operations has been an important component of
Chinas monetary policy. As both the current account and the capital account have
had large surpluses, the PBOC has purchased substantial amounts of foreign currencies
while pegging to the dollar, running up foreign reserves. Since 2003, the PBOC has
also been issuing substantial amounts of central bank bills (CBB). The motivation has
13The PBOC began requiring di¤erent reserve ratios for large and small- to medium-size nancial
institutions in October 2008.
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Figure 5: This gure plots foreign reserves (dotted line) and outstanding central bank
bills (solid line).
been sterilization, the idea being that when banks and households invest in bonds
with long duration, this tends to reduce the holdings of more liquid assets and hence to
reduce M2.14 Figure 5 shows that the magnitude of the issuance of CBB between 2004
and 2008 is about 40 percent of the increase in foreign reserves during the period. As
a result, reserve money grew in tandem with M2 and nominal GDP, at an annual rate
slightly below 20 percent.15
The PBOC started to reduce CBB after 2008. One likely reason behind this change
is that the PBOC may have decided to rely more on reserve requirements, which were
tightened already in 2007. Once these requirements became binding for most banks,
the PBOC could pursue a contractionary policy by altering the reserve requirements,
without the need to issue CBB. An alternative theory for why the CBB program was
scaled back could be that it was perceived to be an ine¤ective policy. For example,
He and Wang (2012) suggest that the interest rates in the interbank money market
responds strongly to changes in the deposit rate and in the required reserve ratio, but
is less sensitive to open market operations. Note that, although the retail interest rates
are heavily regulated, the wholesale interest rates in the interbank money market are
14This policy is, in some sense, the opposite of the policies of quantitative easingand operation
twistpursued by the U.S. Federal Reserve in recent years. The Federal Reserves stated motivation
for this policy is twofold. First, by purchasing long bonds from the public, the public is forced to hold
assets with shorter duration, and this has an expansionary e¤ect. Second, by reducing the supply of
bonds with long duration, the long interest rates will fall, which in turn will stimulate rmsborrowing.
15The annualized growth for reserve money, M2 and nominal GDP from 2003 through 2008 is 19.6,
18.3 and 16.5 percent, respectively. Data: www.pbc.gov.cn.
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Figure 6: This gure plots the one-year central bank bill interest rate (solid line) and
the one-year deposit rate (dotted line).
determined by market clearing.
2.4 Summarizing the facts
We now summarize the main facts for exchange rate policy, monetary policies, capital
controls, and trade surpluses. In the next section we lay out a theory that will allow us
to analyze the e¤ects of these policies.
1. Chinas trade surplus has been growing at times when its real exchange rate has
been appreciating, and has been falling at times when its real exchange rate has
been depreciating, with the exception of the nancial crisis at which time the trade
surplus shrank.
2. China has pervasive capital controls on portfolio investment: Chinese households
are prevented from holding foreign assets, and foreigners are prevented from pur-
chasing Chinese assets. Direct investments are signicantly less regulated.
3. China has regulated the interest rates o¤ered by banks, imposing a oor on lending
rates and a ceiling on deposit rates. This has stied competition in the banking
industry. The government has recently introduced some partial liberalization.
4. Since 1997, Chinas domestic real interest rates has remained above the US interest
rates most of the time.
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3 The Benchmark Model
In this section, we develop a theory of economic transition in China. Our purpose is to
study the implications for welfare and economic outcomes of the policies discussed in the
previous sections. The model extends the framework of SSZ to a setting with multiple
goods and an explicit role for government policy.
3.1 Preferences, Technology and Markets
Preferences and Population: The model economy is populated by overlapping gen-
erations of two-period lived agents who work in the rst period and live o¤ savings in
the second period. Agents consume two goods, a domestically produced good (c) and a
foreign produced good (c).
Preferences are parameterized by the following time-separable utility function:
Ut =
1
1  1=

(c1;t)
" 1
" +
 
c1;t
 " 1
"
 "
" 1 (1 1=)
(1)
+
1
1  1=

(c2;t+1)
" 1
" +
 
c2;t+1
 " 1
"
 "
" 1 (1 1=)
where  is the discount factor,  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES)
of consumption, and " is the (Armington) elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods. We assume that   1; implying that agentssavings are non-decreasing
in the rate of return.
Agents have heterogeneous skills. Each cohort consists of a measure one of agents
with no entrepreneurial skills (workers), and a measure  of agents with entrepreneurial
skills (entrepreneurs).
Technology: There are two types of rms, both requiring capital and labor. Financially
integrated (F) rms operate as standard neoclassical rms. Entrepreneurial (E) rms are
owned by old entrepreneurs who are residual claimants on the prots and who hire young
skilled workers as managers. The key assumptions are that E rms are more productive
than F rms but, due to asymmetric nancial imperfections, E rms are barred from
borrowing from banks. This is an extreme version of the more general model in SSZ
where entrepreneurs can borrow up to an endogenous limit.16
16In section 5 we relax this assumption by allowing new banks to lend to entrepreneurs up to some
limit.
SSZ provides a microfounded explanation based on Acemoglu et al. (2007) that rationalizes this form
of asymmetric credit constraints and productivity di¤erences across rms.
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The technology of F and E rms are represented, respectively, by the following pro-
duction functions:
yFt = k

Ft (AtnFt)
1  ; yEt = kEt (AtnEt)
1  ;
where y is domestic output and k and n denote capital and labor, respectively. Capital
depreciates fully after one period. The technology parameter A grows at an exogenous
rate z; At+1 = (1 + z)At.
"Exchange rate policy": The model economy is part of a world comprising a con-
tinuum of small open economies with identical preferences, half of them producing the
"domestic" good y and the other half producing the "foreign" good y: Since all coun-
tries are small, none can individually a¤ect the world price. The world market relative
price of a home vs. foreign good is assumed to be unity. Although the government
cannot a¤ect world prices, it can distort the price at which the two goods are traded
domestically. The distortion is implemented by a market access restriction for foreign
exporters. More precisely, we denote by e the government-set relative price ("exchange
rate") at which traders can exchange domestic goods for foreign goods. We focus on
e  1 capturing the notion of an "undervalued" exchange rate, which is the case debated
in the Chinese setting. e > 1 implies that the government makes foreign goods articially
more expensive than they would be in the laissez-faire equilibrium. Since the relative
price of foreign goods exceeds the international price, the local good market does not
clear. In particular, foreign producers strictly prefer to sell their good in our domestic
economy rather than in the international market. To enforce its policy, the government
must then impose some rationing and require that foreign traders hold licenses specify-
ing the quantity each can trade with domestic producers.17 We view these market access
restrictions as a modeling expedient to capture the notion that the government exercises
monopoly power in the foreign currency market.18
17In principle, the government could reap rents by auctioning licenses to foreign producers. We
assume that the government foregoes this opportunity and issues licenses for free.
18If the model were extended to allow a search friction in the market for goods, along the lines of Bai
et al. (2013), it would be possible to provide an alternative microfoundation for the assumption that
the government can distort the relative price of home goods and foreign goods, without rents being
present and having the government impose rations and forego rents.
To see this, assume, following Bai et al. (2013), that producers can post prices for their goods and
that consumers can search in several markets. Consumers direct their search e¤ort to the markets that
yield the highest expected utility  they prefer low prices and a low search e¤ort to nd the goods.
Assume that the government forces foreign producers to post their goods at a price e relative to the price
posted by domestic producers. The Chinese market therefore becomes protable for foreign producers
and the producers willingly pay an entry cost to compete in China. This makes the market tightness
16
"Capital controls": There are four assets in the economy: domestic deposits (i.e.,
claims to next-period domestic goods issued by domestic banks), domestic government
bonds (i.e., claims to next-period domestic goods issued by the government), foreign
bonds (i.e., claims to next-period foreign goods issued by foreign agents), and domestic
corporate loans (i.e., claims to next-period domestic goods issued by domestic rms).
We assume that the government imposes capital controls: domestic agents (with the
exception of the government itself) can hold only domestic assets, and foreigners cannot
hold any domestic assets. The government sets the interest rate on domestic government
bonds, and issues domestic bonds so as to meet the demand at that rate. We refer to this
policy as an IRP. The government has access to lump-sum taxes and transfers to cover
possible gains or losses on ERP and IRP. The government period budget constraint is
bt+1 + etb
f
t+1 = Rtbt + etRwb
f
t    t;
where  t denotes the lump-sum tax levied on the young workers and Rt and Rw denote,
respectively, the rates of return on domestic and foreign bonds. The left-hand side is
the total government debt expressed as the sum of debt in domestic (b) and foreign (bf)
goods. Negative debt means a positive asset position. We assume that the government
honours its debt and that it cannot run a Ponzi scheme. Note that the government itself
abides by the market restriction policy: it does not convert foreign goods or assets into
domestic goods at the international price, but does so at the exchange rate e:
Savings: Young workers earn a wage wt and deposit their savings st+1 with domestic
banks paying a gross interest rate Rdt+1. They choose savings so as to maximize utility,
(1), subject to the two budget constraints,
st+1 + c1t + etc

1t = wt    t (2)
c2;t+1 + et+1c

2;t+1 = R
d
t+1st+1: (3)
We assume that households can only hold deposits in their portfolio.
Young skilled agents employed as managers in E rms earn a compensation, mt.
Their savings can be invested either in domestic bank deposits or in physical capital
(which becomes productive in the following period) installed in their own business. For
simplicity, we assume that young managers neither pay taxes nor receive subsidies.
 foreign goods available for sale per domestic consumer  very high and, hence, the probability of
achieving a sale very low. In equilibrium, both domestic and foreign producers break even and foreign
goods are traded at a relative price e. The ine¢ ciency induced by the distorted price is that consumers
search too little for the foreign goods and that too few foreign goods are consumed in equilibrium.
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Banks: Banks collect deposits from workers and invest in corporate loans and govern-
ment bonds. Issuing loans to rms is subject to two sets of frictions:
1. The issuance of loans to rms is subject to an intermediation cost, capturing
operational costs, red tape, etc. We model this as an iceberg cost  per period.
2. Entrepreneurs are constrained in their ability to obtain bank loans. In SSZ we
assume that the output of E rms is non-veriable, and that entrepreneurs can
only pledge to repay a share  of the second-period net prots. In most of the
analysis in this paper we make the simplifying assumption that entrepreneurs
cannot raise any external nancing at all ( = 0). This is relaxed in Section 5.
An arbitrage condition implies that the rate of return on government bonds equals
the lending rate to rms net of the intermediation cost. More formally, Rl = R
1  ; where
Rl is the interest rate on loans. Moreover, in a competitive equilibrium, the rate of
return on banksassets must equal the deposit rate, Rd = R.19
Since banks are pure intermediaries with no equity, their balance sheet yields:
bt+1 +K
F
t+1 = st+1:
The left-hand side are the net bank assets: government bonds and loans to F rms. The
right-hand side are the liabilities, i.e., deposits. Note that the corporate loans issued at
t are equivalent to the aggregate investments in F rms, which in turn equal KFt+1; due
to the assumption of full capital depreciation.
F rms: Prot maximization implies that Rlt equals the marginal product of capital in
F rms. Let F  KF= (ANF ) denote capital per e¤ective unit of labor. Then,
Ft =

(1  ) 
Rt
 1
1 
: (4)
The wage, then, equals the value of the marginal product of labor:
wt = (1  ) (Ft)At: (5)
Note that the wage is expressed in units of local goods. Since households consume a
basket of domestic and foreign goods, an exchange rate depreciation does not a¤ect w
but still reduces the real wage in terms of the composite consumption good.
19In section 5, we consider the case in which the interest rate on deposits, Rd, is set by government
regulation with the assumption that Rd  R.
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E rms: Following SSZ, we assume that E rms must hire a manager and pay him
a compensation m   y in order to satisfy an incentive-compatibility constraint.20
The incentive constraint is important, since in its absence managers would be paid the
workerswage, and the equilibrium would feature no capital accumulation in E rms and
no transition from SOE to DPE. A more detailed motivation of the incentive constraint
is contained in SSZ.
The value of a rm owned by an old entrepreneur with capital kEt is given by the
solution to the following problem:
t (kEt) = max
mt;nEt

(kEt)
 (AtnEt)
1   mt   wtnEt
	
: (6)
The problem is subject to the incentive-compatibility constraint discussed above. This
is binding in equilibrium:
mt =  (kEt)
 (AtnEt)
1  : (7)
Moreover, an arbitrage condition in the labor market implies that the wage, wt; is as in
(5). The optimal contract implies that the incentive constraint is binding:
Taking the rst-order condition with respect to nE and substituting in the equilibrium
wage yields the employment choice of the rm:
nEt = ((1   ))
1


(1  ) 
Rt
  1
1  kEt
At
: (8)
The capital per e¤ective unit of labor in E rms, denoted E;t, is then given by
E;t  KE;t
AtNE;t
= F;t  ((1   )) 
1
 (9)
Plugging (7) and (8) into (6) yields the value of the rm:
t (kEt) = (1   )
1
 
1 

Rt
1   kEt  tkEt; (10)
where  is the rate of return to capital in E rms. In order to ensure that t >
Rt
1  ,
so that entrepreneurs are credit constrained (i.e., if they were allowed to borrow at the
going rate, they would like to do so), we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1  >  

1
1  
 1
1 
.
20The managerial compensation must also exceed the workerswage rate (mt > wt). We restrict
attention to parameters and initial conditions such that the participation constraint is never binding in
equilibrium.
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3.2 Savings and investments decisions
In this section, we analyze the savings decisions of workers and entrepreneurs.
3.2.1 Workers
Workers maximize utility, (1), subject to a lifetime budget constraint,
wt    t = c1;t + etc1;t +
c2;t+1 + et+1c

2;t+1
Rdt+1
: (11)
The First Order Conditions of this problem yield:
c1;t = 
 
t
 
1 + e1 "t
  "
" 1 ;
c2;t+1 =

t
Rdt+1
   
1 + e1 "t+1
  "
" 1 ;
c1;t = c1;t  e "t ;
c2;t+1 = c2;t+1e
 "
t+1
where t is a Lagrangian multiplier. Hence, the Euler equation for the consumption of
the domestic good yields,
c2;t+1
c1;t
=
 
Rdt+1
 1 + e1 "t+1
1 + e1 "t
  "
" 1
Note that the Euler equation depends on the time evolution of the exchange rate.
In particular, if et+1 = et, the level of e does not matter. Consider, next, a declining
sequence of e: et > et+1: To x ideas, suppose Rdt+1 = 1: In this case, the consumption
growth of the domestic good is positive (negative) if  > " ( < "). The reason for the
ambiguity in consumption growth is that, on the one hand, the consumption basket is
overall more expensive in period t than in period t+1. Thus, the IES of consumption
calls for a positive consumption growth in both the domestic and the foreign good. On
the other hand, in period t the foreign good has a higher relative price than in period
t+1. This calls for a negative consumption growth of the domestic good (i.e., in period
t, the consumer substitutes the expensive foreign good with the cheaper domestic good).
Which of the two forces dominates depends on the comparison between " (the Armington
elasticity) and  (the IES of consumption).
Substituting in the expressions above into the budget constraints, (11), yields the
expression of the consumption of the domestic good in period t for the young:
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c1;t =
wt    t
1 + 
 
Rdt+1
 1 1+e1 "t+1
1+e1 "t
  1
" 1
 
1 + e1 "t

The private savings of the workers are, then, given by
st+1 = wt    t   c1;t   etc1;t
=
0BB@1  1
1 + 
 
Rdt+1
 1 1+e1 "t+1
1+e1 "t
  1
" 1
1CCA (wt    t) :
As long as   1; the savings of the young workers at t increase in Rdt+1 and in et+1=et:
However, if et+1 = et; then savings do not depend on the exchange rate.
3.2.2 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneurssaving decision is similar. However, the entrepreneurs earn a man-
agerial compensation (mt) instead of a wage net of taxes (wt    t), and have access to
an asset that yields a higher return (t = (1   )
1
 
1 
 Rt
1  > R
d
t ), since they can invest
in their own business. Thus, their lifetime budget constraint can be expressed as:
mt = c^1;t + etc^

1;t +
c^2;t+1 + et+1c^

2;t+1
t+1
; (12)
where hats refer to entrepreneurial variables. Operating as above, the optimal rst-
period consumption yields:
c^1;t =
mt
 1t+1

1+e1 "t+1
1+e1 "t
  1
" 1
+ 1
 
1 + e1 "t
 ;
and the aggregate entrepreneurial savings are given by:
s^t+1 =
 
mt   c^1;t   etc^1;t


=
0BB@1  1
1 +  1t+1

1+e1 "t+1
1+e1 "t
  1
" 1
1CCAmt:
Note that s^t+1 is increasing in Rt+1 (since t+1 is increasing in Rt+1), and in et+1=et:
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3.2.3 Foreign position
Let !t denote the net position of the government at t expressed in units of domestic
good. In particular, !t is the di¤erence between the purchase of foreign bonds ( etbft+1),
entitling the government to foreign goods at t + 1, and the issuance of domestic debt
( bt+1), committing the government to deliver domestic goods at t+ 1. More formally,
!t =  

etb
f
t+1 + bt+1

: Hence,21
!t =  Rtbt   etRwbft +  t: (13)
Since we assumed that all bonds have a one-period maturity, and that the government
neither consumes nor invests, the period budget constraint implies that the government
net position must equal the di¤erence between the tax revenue at t and the interest
payments on domestic and foreign bonds.
Alternatively, the governments foreign position can be decomposed as follows:
 etbft+1| {z }
trade surplus
= (st+1  KF;t+1)| {z }
savings gap households & rms
+
Rw

 etbft   bt

| {z }
interests on net govt. wealth
  (Rt  Rw) bt| {z }
IRP losses
+  t|{z}
taxes| {z }
net government savings
:
In words, the trade surplus is the sum of the savings gap of the private sector (households
savings minus domestic rmsinvestments) plus the net government savings (recall that,
for simplicity, we have assumed that there are no government investments). The latter
can be decomposed into the time t tax revenue, the return on government wealth eval-
uated at the world interest rate, and the losses associated with the IRP. In particular,
assuming bt > 0; there are losses (gains) whenever the government sets the interest rate
on government debt higher (lower) than the world interest rate.
If the government engages in no active ERP or IRP, then, et+1 = et = 1; Rt = Rw;
and  t = 0: Moreover, b
f
t = bt since the government would simply enforce the legal
obligation that private domestic agents cannot hold foreign assets, by exchanging one-
to-one foreign assets for government bonds. The equation above then simplies to
 bft+1 = st+1  KF;t+1;
21In the case in which the government imposes a deposit rate Rd < R banks make prots that are
transferred to the government. These prots should be added to the right-hand side of equation (13)
and of the ensuing expressions below.
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which is the case studied by SSZ. As emphasized there, s increases over time due to the
productivity growth, whereas KF falls due to the declining employment and investments
in the F sector during the transition.
3.3 Post-transition convergence.
Once the transition is completed at period T all workers are employed in E rms,
NEt = 1 for t > T . Moreover, the aggregate capital stock is given by KEt+1 =
1  1
1+ 1t+1

mt, which implies standard neoclassical dynamics of capital per e¢ -
ciency units;
Et+1 =
 
1  1
1 + 
 
 (1   ) 1Et+1
 1
!

 
1 + z
Et:
This law of motion converges to a unique steady state. Along the convergence path, there
is capital deepening over time. Consequently, wage growth increases after the transition
is completed. Thereafter, wages and output increase towards a steady state. In the post-
transition economy all investments are self-nanced by the managers/entrepreneurs of
the E rms, while the workers savings feed a large trade surplus. Recall that this
extreme form of nancial constraint is maintained for simplicity here. In SSZ we assume
that even E rms have a partial access to external nancing, i.e., banks nance part of
the investment process even in the post-transition economy.
Figure 7 shows a simulated transition path for the E rm employment share, wages
per e¤ective unit of labor (wt=At), total output and trade surplus under the assumption
of laissez-faire policies. Namely, in all periods the government sets the interest rate equal
to the world interest rate, and the exchange rate equal to one.
4 Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Policy
In this section we consider the e¤ects of specic ERP and IRP. Consider an economy that
starts in period zero. From period one and onwards the economy is as described above
(we label this as the transition period to emphasize the takeover of the E sector and
the decline of the F sector). In period zero, (i.e., the pre-reform period) the economy
has a simpler structure: Agents are endowed with some income earned in pre-reform
activities. There is no pre-installed capital, and rms can invest in capital that becomes
productive in period one. A measure  of young agents have entrepreneurial skills, and
contemplate becoming entrepreneurs in period one. Their endowment is denoted by m0:
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Figure 7: This gure plots the dynamics of E-rm employment share (Panel A), wage
rate (Panel B), total output (Panel C) and surplus output ratio (Panel D).
The other young agents have no entrepreneurial skills and just consume and save for
retirement out of their endowment, w0: Old agents have an endowment wOLD0 that is
entirely consumed. The government has neither assets nor liabilities, and taxes are zero.
The government announces a sequence of policies, fet; Rt+1;  t+1g1t=0 subject to an
intertemporal budget constraint. Note that, since agents live only for two periods,
the results would be equivalent if policies were announced, sequentially, one period in
advance. We consider a class of scal policies such that the net government position is
constant in the long run. Moreover, we assume that the government pursues a laissez-
faire policy from period t = 1 and onwards: for t  1; et = 1, Rt+1 = Rw, and  t
is constant at the level that balances the long run government budget. The focus of
our analysis is then on the ERP and IRP set in period zero. The assumption that the
activist policy (e0 6= 1 and R1 6= Rw) lasts only for one period is for simplicity. It
is straightforward, but more cumbersome to extend the activist policy beyond period
zero.22
Consider the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. Since the tax (or
subsidy) is assumed to keep government wealth constant from period one and onwards
22Our ERP is related to the analysis of Bacchetta et al. (2014). Based on a di¤erent model, they
consider an economy with capital controls and derive the optimal exchange rate policy. They nd that
it is optimal to have an initial real depreciation of the currency followed by an appreciation in the long
run. In our paper, we do not attempt to characterize the optimal policy, but focus on the trade-o¤ in
welfare across di¤erent social groups (workers vs. entrepreneurs) and cohorts.
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(!t = ~!), then, for all t  1 we have
 t =  =   (Rw   1) ~!;
where, recall, !t =  

etb
f
t+1 + bt+1

:
Consider the initial period, when, recall b0 = b
f
0 =  0 = 0: Thus, the period budget
constraint yields:
b1 + e0b
f
1 = 0
) bf1 =  
b1
e0
;
where b1 is determined by the domestic savings gap. Next, consider the period budget
constraint in period one, imposing that e1 = 1; and  1 =  :
b2 + b
f
2 = R1b1 +Rwb
f
1   
) bf2 =

R1
Rw
  1
e0

b1   b2;
where we have used the facts that  = (Rw   1)

b2 + b
f
2

; ~! =  

e1b
f
2 + b2

; and
bf1 =   b1e0 : Note, again, that b2 is determined by the domestic savings gap. The same
holds true for the following periods, thus, for t  2 we have:
bft =

R1
Rw
  1
e0

b1   bt
Note that the government net position vis-a-vis the rest of the world equals to ~! + bt;
where ~! =

R1
Rw
  1
e0

b1 is the loss incurred to run the ERP and IRP in the rst period,
and bt is the savings gap of the country. Recall that by assumption the government
wealth does not grow after period two. Alternatively, we could have assumed that
 t = 0 for some periods, in which case the government net position would change over
time.
Next, we move to calculate b1: This is determined by the domestic savings gap:
b1 = s1N0  KF;1
= w0N0
0B@1  1
1 + R 11

2
1+e1 "0
  1
" 1
1CA KF;1:
Finally, we must determine domestic investments, KF;1 and KE;1. Consider, rst,
the E sector, where investments are determined by the entrepreneurssavings:
KE;1 = s^1 =M0
0B@1  1
1 +  11

2
1+e1 "0
  1
" 1
1CA
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where
1 = (1   )
1
 
1 

R1
1   :
Since  > 1; KE;1 is increasing in 1; which is in turn increasing in R1: Thus, KE;1 is
increasing in R1: Moreover, KE;1 is increasing in e0:
Next, consider the F sector. Following SSZ yields:
KF;1 = F;1A1 (N1  NE;1)
= A1

R1
(1  )
  1
1 
N1   (1   )
1
 
1 

0B@1  1
1 +  11

2
1+e1 "0
  1
" 1
1CAm0
| {z }
KE1
The equality stems from the denition of F and the fact that employment in the F
sector is the residual that clears the labor market after the E rms have decided their
employment. It uses the equilibrium expressions of F;1 given in (4), that of 1 given in
(10), and the fact that, from (9), NE;1 = 1
 F;1

KE;1
A1
. Note that:
1. KF;1 is decreasing in R1 via two channels: rst, because an increase in the in-
terest rate decreases F;1, and second because it increases the investment rate of
entrepreneurs (assuming that  > 1), thereby reducing NF;1;
2. KF;1 is decreasing in e0 because a temporarily undervalued exchange rate increases
the savings of entrepreneurs (assuming that  > 1), thereby speeding up the
transition.
4.1 Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the model in order to construct a benchmark for the quan-
titative analysis in the following sections. The usual caveat applies to quantitative
predictions derived from two-period models.23 Nevertheless, a numerical analysis based
on realistic parameters is interesting, both to illustrate the properties of the model and
to give a sense of how the model predictions are sensitive to changes in the di¤erent
parameters.
Our calibration follows Song et al. (2014). On the technology side, we set  = 0:5
so that the capital share of output is 0.5 (Bai et al., 2006) in the initial stage of the
23Song et al. (2011) and Song et al. (2014) consider a multi-period OLG versions of the two-period
model model where one period is one year. Such an extension is beyond the scope of this paper.
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transition. The remaining parameters are calibrated so as to match some empirical
moments (see Song et al. 2014 for a more detailed discussion). In particular,  and 
are chosen to be such that the model is consistent with the capital-output ratio in E rms
being equal to half of the corresponding ratio in F rms for manufacturing industries,
and that the rate of return on capital is 9% larger in E rms than in F rms.24 The
implied parameter values are  = 0:27 and  = 2:73. With this parameter the TFP of an
E rm is 1:65 times larger than the TFP of an F rm, in line with the estimates of Hsieh
and Klenow (2009).25 On the demand side,  is calibrated to 0:9730 so as to generate
a 25% household savings rate (in the absence of activist policies), which matches the
average urban household savings rate in 2000-2010. As it turns out, the model yields
a quantitatively plausible annualized trade surplus equal to 3% of GDP in the initial
period, which is slightly below the average of 4% in 2000-2012 (note that in some policy
experiments the initial trade surplus will be higher than this). Finally, we set the IES to
 = 2, also in accordance with Song et al. (2014). The assumption that   1 implies
that agents increase their life-cycle savings when they face a higher rate of return on
wealth. Setting  = 2 is in line with the recent empirical study of Gruber (2013), based
on cross-sectional heterogeneity in the after-tax interest rate.26
Finally, we must calibrate the Armington elasticity, ", a parameter that has no
counterpart in our earlier studies. We set " = 2, consistent with Feenstra et al. (2014).
Previous estimates range between a lower bound of unity, based on macro data (e.g.,
Heathcote and Perri 2002) and much higher values in micro studies (e.g., Broda and
Weinstein 2006, and Romalis 2007). Based on these studies, Acemoglu et al. (2012)
calibrate (a version of) the Armington elasticity to 3.3.
We assume an annualized world interest rate of 2.5%, i.e., Rw = (1:025)
30. In times
of no activist policies, the interest rate on government bonds is set equal to 3.5%, i.e.,
24SSZ documents that in the manufacturing sector domestic private enterprises (DPE) have on average
a ratio of prots per unit of book-value capital 9% larger than that of SOEs during the period 1998-2007.
A similar di¤erence in rate of return on capital is reported by Islam et al. (2006).
25We abstract from long-run productivity growth trends, and set At = 1 (this is equivalent from con-
sidering normalizing wages and output in terms of a trending At). Note that the economy nevertheless
features GDP growth due to the transition from F rms to E rms.
26There is no consensus in the literature on the magnitude of the IES of consumption. Earlier studies
based on macro data estimate the IES to be signicantly smaller than unity (Campbell and Mankiw
1989, Hall 1988). Cooley and Presott (1995) argue for an IES of unity. However, recent studies estimate
the IES to be larger than unity (see Attanasio and Vissing-Jørgensen 2003; Gruber 2013; Mulligan 2002).
Based on these studies, Angeletos (2007) argues for calibrating the IES of consumption above unity even
in high-frequency dynastic models. In our two-period model, one period is 30 years. It seems plausible
that high-frequency uctuations in consumption are more painful to a household than low-frequency
ones, because people can adapt their habits when changes occur more gradually.
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R = (1:035)30 recall that R pins down both the deposit rate and the lending rate to
SOEs. We set the iceberg cost to  = 0:58 which implies an annualized 5.5% return to
capital in SOE.27 Again, in times of no activist policies we set et = 1.
We consider the following activist policies:
1. Interest rate policy: we set a higher initial interest rate on government bonds,
R1 = 1:035
30). As robustness, we consider alternative policies where R1 = 1:0330
and R1 = 1:04530, respectively.
2. Exchange rate policy: we consider a one-period undervaluation of 27% (so, e0 =
1:27 and et = 1 for t > 0), in the ball park of estimates from the advocates of the
thesis that the undervaluation of the RMB is a signicant determinant of Chinas
trade surplus (see, e.g., Goldstein and Lardi 2009). As robustness, we consider
undervaluations of 5% and 40%.
4.2 E¤ect of ERP and IRP on trade surplus
We start by deriving the implications of the activist policies (ERP and IRP) on the
savings gap and on the trade surplus. First, we obtain analytical results. Then, we
derive quantitative results based on the calibration described above.
Consider, rst, the trade surplus:
b1 = s1N0  KF;1
= w0N0
0B@1  1
1 + R 11

2
1+e1 "0
  1
" 1
1CA KF;1:
Both a larger R1 and a larger e0 increase savings (s1) and decrease investments in F rms
(KF;1). Thus, activist policies involving e0 > e1 and R1 > Rw increase unambiguously
the savings gap. Next, recall that the expression of the trade surplus in period one yields:
 e0bf1 = b1: Thus, the trade surplus expressed in units of domestic good is increasing in
R1 and in e0:
27In Song et al. (2011) and Song et al. (2014), we assume a declining  to capture some exogenous
nancial development. Here, for simplicity, we assume a constant ; since its dynamics does not a¤ect
dimensions we emphasize in this paper. Moreover, the value of  in our previous papers where one
period is one year is not comparable with that in this paper, due to the di¤erent assumptions about
depreciation.
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We can then calculate how the trade surplus evolves over time after the rst period
(t  1):
 bft+1| {z }
trade surplus
= (st+1  KF;t+1)| {z }
domestic savings gap
+ ~!|{z}
net govt wealth
An increase in the savings gap translates one-to-one into an increase in the government
surplus. In addition, the trade surplus depends on the losses the government runs
on its activist policies in the rst period. As discussed above such losses are equal
to  ~! =

R1
Rw
  1
e0

b1: Thus a higher R1 or a higher e0 increases the losses of the
government, as long as b1 is positive. So, after the rst period, the activist policies
have an ambiguous e¤ect on the trade surplus: a larger R1 and a larger e0 increase the
domestic private savings gap, but reduce the net government wealth. In the long run,
the e¤ect on the domestic private savings gap vanishes, and the only remaining e¤ect of
the policies is that the government is poorer, implying a lower trade surplus.
Consider, next the quantitative e¤ects. Figure 8 shows simulated trade surplus tra-
jectories corresponding to the two baseline activist policies (R1 = 1:03530 and e0 = 1:27)
compared to the trajectories under the laissez-faire policy (R1 = 1:02530 and e0 = 1)
in the calibrated economy. Panel (a) shows the e¤ect of the IRP. Initially, the IRP
increases the trade surplus (as a share of GDP) from 3% to 6.4%. This is due to two
forces. On the one hand, since  > 1; intertemporal substitution reduces consumption
when agents face a higher deposit rate. On the other hand, a higher interest rate makes
borrowing more expensive for F rms, thereby reducing externally nanced investments
(note that the investments of E rms increase, but this is irrelevant for the trade surplus,
since it is nanced entirely through the savings of entrepreneurs). The gap shrinks in
period 1 and is reverted from period 2 and onwards, reecting, as explained above, that
the government is poorer and must levy a tax. Panel (b) shows the e¤ect of the ERP.
The e¤ect is qualitatively similar to that of the IRP, but quantitatively smaller. The
trade surplus (as a share of GDP) increases from 3% to 4.1% in the rst period, then
the economy runs a slightly lower surplus than in the laissez-faire benchmark. Recall
that this e¤ect hinges on the assumption that  > 1; i.e., agentssavings increase when
the price of consumption goods decreases over time.
Figure 9 shows how sensitive the results are to variations in the activist policies. In
Panel A we show two alternative IRPs (R1 = 1:0330 and R1 = 1:04530). As expected, the
larger the IRP the larger the e¤ects. Remarkably, even an increase of half a percentage
point in the annualized interest rate relative to laissez-faire would increase the initial
trade surplus by 1.6 percentage points. In Panel B we show two alternative ERPs (e0 =
29
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Figure 8: The solid lines in both panels plot the trade surplus as a share of GDP in the
laissez-faire economy (R = Rw = 1:02530 and e0 = 1). The dotted lines in panels A and
B are the corresponding gures under the IRP (R1 = 1:03530) and ERP (e0 = 1:27),
respectively.
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Figure 9: The solid lines in both panels plot the trade surplus as a share of GDP in the
laissez-faire economy (R = Rw = 1:02530 and e0 = 1). The dotted and dashed lines in
panel A are the corresponding gures under the IRPs R1 = 1:0330 and R1 = 1:04530;
respectively. The dotted and dashed lines in panel B are the corresponding gures under
the ERPs e0 = 1:05 and e0 = 1:4; respectively.
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1:05 and e0 = 1:4). Again, the larger the ERP the larger the e¤ects. Remarkably, a small
undervaluation corresponding to the lower end of the empirical estimates has hardly any
e¤ect. A dubiously realistic 40% undervaluation has only a marginal incremental e¤ect
relative to the 27% benchmark.
Our model shows that savings rate and trade surplus are a¤ected by the real exchange
rate dynamics, but independent of its level. In other words, the ERP a¤ects trade
surplus only if the real exchange rate varies over time. Intuitively, the anticipation
of future appreciation (depreciation) would increase the returns of holding domestic
assets, resulting in a higher (lower) savings rate and, hence, a bigger (smaller) surplus.
The prediction that a larger trade surplus is associated with the expectation of an
appreciation of the exchange rate is broadly in line with the empirical evidence discussed
above.
As explained above, the e¤ect of an expected real appreciation on the trade surplus
works through the savings rate (consumers delay purchasing expensive import goods).
Figure 10 plots the empirical dynamics of the aggregate savings rate and real e¤ective
exchange rate. As we documented in Section 2, the RMB experienced a real depreciation
over the 1998-2005 period and a real appreciation thereafter. Our model predicts that,
if  > 1 and consumers have perfect foresight about exchange rate movements, then the
exchange rate dynamics should tend to lower the savings rate before 2004 and increase it
thereafter, especially during 2005-2008, when the appreciation was particularly strong.
As it turns out, the aggregate savings rate did fall between 1998 and 2000 and it did
rise sharply between 2005 and 2009. This is in line with the e¤ect of the exchange rate
mechanism of our theory. However, counter to the predictions of our model, the savings
rate also rose sharply almost eight percentage points during the period 2000-2005.
This suggests that other factors other than the exchange rate policy have been at work.
See Storesletten and Zilibotti (2014) for a review of factors a¤ecting the savings rate
and investments in China.
4.3 E¤ect of ERP and IRP on real wages
Consider, next, the e¤ects of the activist policies on real wages. For simplicity, we
restrict attention to the baseline activist policies. The equilibrium expression of wt in
equation (5) is increasing in Rt and independent of et. However, one should bear in mind
that wt is expressed in terms of units of the domestic good, and is not the real wage in
terms of the consumption basket. Since households consume both domestic and foreign
31
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Figure 10: The solid and dashed lines are the aggregate savings rates (%), the left axis,
and the annual real e¤ective exchange rate, the right axis, respectively. The annual
real e¤ective exchange rates are the average of the normalized quarterly real e¤ective
exchange rates in Figure 1.
goods, the real wage is a¤ected by changes in the relative prices. Given our isoelastic
preferences, the consumersprice level is given by
Pt =
 
1 + e1 "t
 1
1 " :
Since the price level is increasing in et; the real wage is decreasing in et.28
Figure 11 compares the real wage (wt=Pt) trajectories corresponding to alternative
activist policies (R1 = 1:03530 and e0 = 1:27; respectively) with those under the laissez-
faire policy. Under laissez-faire, the normalized real wage is constant throughout the
transition (i.e., until period 2). Thereafter, when E rms employ the whole labor force,
wages grow due to capital deepening and converge to their steady state level, as explained
in section 3.3.
Panel A shows the e¤ect of the IRP. Wages in period 1 are lower than under laissez-
faire, because a higher lending rate reduces capital intensity and, hence, the wage rate
paid by F rms. Once the activist policy is over, wages are the same as under laissez-
faire. However, the transition is faster under the IRP, because the high cost of external
nancing speeds up the demise of F rms. In addition, higher prots increase entre-
preneurspropensity to save since  > 1: The faster transition triggers an earlier onset
28For simplicity, we focus on activist policies in period zero only. In this case, setting e0 > 1 reduces
the real value of the endowment w0: An activist ERP in later periods would imply a reduction in real
wages as discussed in the text.
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Figure 11: The solid lines in both panels plot the real wage in the laissez-faire econ-
omy (R = Rw = 1:02530 and e0 = 1). The dotted lines in panels A and B are the
corresponding gures under the IRP (R1 = 1:03530) and ERP (e0 = 1:27), respectively.
of the neoclassical wage growth. Note that the activist IRP benets the entrepreneurs
during the transition and the future workers who enjoy higher wages. The e¤ects are
quantitatively large: the benchmark IRP lowers wages by 25%.29 Panel B shows the
e¤ect of the ERP. The policy reduces the real value of the initial endowment, causing
a 10% reduction in the real wage. Thereafter, capital accumulates somewhat faster in
the E sector, speeding up the transition. Thus, after period 2, wages are slightly above
what they would have been under laissez-faire.
4.4 E¤ect of ERP and IRP on GDP
Consider, next, the e¤ect of activist policies on GDP. A higher e0 stimulates growth
by increasing savings and capital accumulation in the E sector. A higher R1 implies a
lower capital labor ratio in F rms and a lower wage in period one. This per se reduces
the output of F rms. At the same time, a higher level of R1 speeds up (precisely by
reducing wage costs) capital accumulation and growth of E rms. Since E rms are
29The quantitative e¤ects are sensitive to the assumption of the two-period model, here. In a model
where one period is one year and the annual depreciation rate were 8%, an increase in the lending rate
from 5.5% to 6.5% would lower wages by 7%. In contrast, in our two-period model the corresponding
interest rate policy, i.e., increasing the annualized interest rate from 5.5% to 6.5%, lowers wages by 25%.
The reason for this discrepancy is that the depreciation rate cannot be lower than zero in a two-period
model. The quantitative implications from two-period models should be interpreted subject to this
caveat.
33
more productive, the composition e¤ect causes an increase in the average TFP, and thus
in GDP. Hence, the e¤ect of increasing R1 is ambiguous. More formally, let Yt denote
total GDP. Since the working population is constant and normalized to unity, then Yt is
also GDP per worker. Thus, for t  1 :
Yt = YF;t + YE;t = 

F;t

1 +
 
1   NE;t

At
=

Rt
(1  )
  
1 
+
 
1   ((1   ))
1

Rt
(1  )
KE;t
At
:
The rst line follows from the fact that YF;t = AtF;t and YE;t = At

E;t, and from the
denition of F and E: Then, using expression (9), and rearranging terms, one gets the
right-hand side expression in the rst line. The second equality follows from eliminating
F and NE using (4) and (8).
Consider policy interventions in the rst period. An increase in e0 increases output
Yt for all t  1 by increasing KE;t. An increase in R1 has instead ambiguous net e¤ects.
As discussed above, it decreases F;t and increases NE;t via its e¤ects on wages and on
entrepreneurssavings rates. The sign of the e¤ect hinges on KE;1: If the entrepreneurial
sector is initially very small, the activist policy decreases output initially, and increases
it in future.
Figure 12 shows the quantitative e¤ect of the baseline activist policies relative to
laissez-faire. Panel A shows the e¤ect of the IRP. Initially, the activist policy reduces
output growth. The quantitative e¤ect is large, and comparable to the e¤ect on wages.
However, after the rst period the economy benets from the faster capital accumulation
in the E sector, implying a faster convergence to the steady state. Panel B shows the
e¤ect of the ERP. In this case, the e¤ect is very small and barely visible in the graph.
Even a 40% undervaluation yields similar results. This suggests that the manipulation
of the exchange rate is not a quantitatively important channel for growth.
4.5 Robustness
In this section, we perform some sensitivity analysis to variations in the preference
elasticities  and ". We focus on these parameters since there is some uncertainty about
their magnitudes in the empirical literature, as discussed above. We focus on the e¤ects
on the trade surplus.
Consider, rst, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. As dis-
cussed above, the e¤ect of the ERP hinges on  > 1: Figure 13 shows the results under
34
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Figure 12: The solid lines in both panels plot the GDP in terms of world prices in the
laissez-faire economy (R = Rw = 1:02530 and e0 = 1). The dotted lines in panels A and
B are the corresponding gures under the IRP (R1 = 1:03530) and ERP (e0 = 1:27),
respectively.
the alternative values  2 f1:01; 2:5g:When  = 1:01; agents are less willing to substitute
consumption intertemporally, and thus they save less. This has two main consequences
for the IRP. First, the IRP has no e¤ect on the trade surplus in period zero. Second, the
transition is slower since managers save less and capital accumulation in E rms is more
moderate. The ERP has no impact, and overall has very small e¤ects, when  = 1: In
particular, a change in e0 leaves savings una¤ected due to the cancellation of an income
and a substitution e¤ect. The only e¤ect of the policy is through the government budget
constraint, and its sign is generally ambiguous. In the calibrated economy featuring a
structural trade surplus, the EPR entails a cost for the government which purchases
foreign bonds at unfavorable terms of trade. The government decit causes a small
decline in future trade surpluses. When  = 2:5; the results are qualitatively similar, if
quantitatively stronger, than in the baseline experiment with  = 2 (see Figure 13).
Consider, next, the Armington elasticity ". The IRP is not a¤ected by the value of
": To see why, note that in our model the propensity to consume equals
1=f1+  Rdt+1 1 [ 1 + e1 "t+1 =  1 + e1 "t ]( 1)=(" 1)g. When et = et+1, the Armington
elasticity has no impact on consumption and savings. Thus, the e¤ect of the IRP is
invariant to ", given that we assume e0 = 1 in this policy experiment. However, the
Armington elasticity does inuence the e¤ectiveness of the ERP. The e¤ect of the ERP
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Panel C: Real Exchange Rate Policy ( g=1)
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Figure 13: The solid lines in all panels plot the trade surplus as a share of GDP in the
laissez-faire economy (R = Rw = 1:02530 and e0 = 1). The dotted lines in the upper
(lower) panels are the trade surpluses under the IRP (ERP) R1 = 1:03530 (e0 = 1:27).
The left panels assume  = 1:001: The right panels assume  = 2:5.
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Figure 14: The solid line plots the trade surplus as a share of GDP in the laissez-
faire economy (R = Rw = 1:02530 and e0 = 1). The dotted and dashed lines are the
trade surpluses under the ERP for di¤erent values of ": In particular, the dotted line
corresponds to the case of " = 1 while the dashed line corresponds to the case of " = 3:3.
The laissez-faire is invariant to ":
is decreasing in ": To see why, note that when the Armington elasticity is high, agents
are more willing to substitute domestic for foreign goods in response to a temporary
undervaluation, implying a smaller e¤ect on savings. Thus, a low Armington elasticity
is equivalent to a larger e¤ective temporary undervaluation. The quantitative e¤ects
across the range of empirically plausible estimates are tiny. Figure 14 shows the results
under the alternative values " 2 f1; 3:3g. Lowering " from 3:3 to 1 increases the rst-
period trade surplus from 4% to 4.1% under the ERP (note that the laissez-faire is
independent of " since et = 1 for all t).
4.6 Welfare e¤ects of ERP and IRP
In this section we explore the welfare and distributional e¤ects of the activist policies.
We consider, how di¤erent policies a¤ect workers relative to entrepreneurs within each
cohort and across generations. Welfare e¤ects are evaluated in terms of equivalent
variation, namely, the percentage increase in consumption under the laissez-faire policy
needed to make the agent indi¤erent between the laissez-faire and the activist policy.
Figure 15 shows the result for the calibrated economy, focusing on the baseline IRP
(R1 = 1:03530) and ERP (e0 = 1:27). The graphs show the welfare gains associated
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with the activist policy for each cohort. Each point along the x-axis represents the birth
period of a particular cohort. Welfare e¤ects are broken down by occupation (workers
vs. managers/entrepreneurs).
Consider, next, the IRP. The initial generation perceives a small welfare gain due to
the high interest rates on savings, while their endowment is una¤ected by assumption.
The generation of workers born in period 1 su¤ers a large (30%) welfare loss from an
increase in R1, due to the lower wages (see Figure 11). For the same reason, managers
and entrepreneurs of E rms benet from an increase in R1. All subsequent generations
of managers gain, since they work in "larger" rms, earning a higher compensation when
working as managers, and then operate larger rms themselves as old entrepreneurs. In
other terms, the e¤ect of the larger capital accumulation in the rst period triggered
by the distortion has a permanent e¤ect on the welfare of all subsequent generations
of entrepreneurs (the e¤ect only vanishes asymptotically). The welfare e¤ects for the
workers are more complex. The pre-tax wages of the worker are not a¤ected until time
3, when the transition is over. However, all workers pay higher taxes to make up for
the capital losses of the government. Thus, on the one hand, the earlier generations
living through the economic transition su¤er a loss from the activist policies. On the
other hand, the activist policy speeds up the transition, implying that the wage growth
induced by capital deepening starts earlier.
Consider, next, the ERP. The rst generations of both workers and entrepreneurs
are worse o¤ under the activist policy, because foreign goods are more expensive, and
their consumption is distorted both intra- and intertemporally. The welfare e¤ect is
quantitatively large, amounting to 5.0% for managers 8.0% for workers. The subsequent
generations of managers also gain, due to the larger capital accumulation in the rst
period (see the discussion for the IRP). For workers, the e¤ects are ambiguous, mirroring
the discussion of the ERP.
Interestingly, while both the IRP and the ERP are growth-enhancing, neither benets
the workers until the end of the transition (period 3 in the calibrated economy). Thus,
the activist policies cause persistent losses for the workers that extend over several
generations.
5 Internal Financial Liberalization
In this section, we extend the model presented above to study the e¤ect of regulations
of the domestic banking sector, and of their removal, i.e., nancial liberalization. To
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Figure 15: The gures display the welfare e¤ects of activist policies. Welfare is measured
as the percentage of lifetime consumption workers and managers/entrepreneurs are will-
ing to give up to move from the laissez-faire policy (R = Rw = 1:02530 and e0 = 1) to
the IRP (R1 = 1:03530, panel A) or the ERP (e0 = 1:27, panel B). The x-axis represent
the birth period of each cohort.
simplify the analysis, we assume that home and foreign goods are perfect substitutes, i.e.,
"!1; as in SSZ. Moreover, we assume that et = 1 and Rt = R; for all t: Generalizing
the analysis along these dimensions is straightforward and yields no surprising additional
implications.
To capture more accurately the pre-reform scenario, we assume that the deposit rate
is not determined by market forces, but by regulation. More precisely, the government
sets a ceiling on the deposit rate, denoted by Rd < R. This implies, as discussed below,
that the statutory maximum deposit rate is binding. Once a bank o¤ers the maximum
deposit rate Rd, there is nothing the bank can do to attract more deposits. Moreover,
deposits are the only source of external funds for the banks in particular, banks cannot
issue bonds nor can they borrow from abroad, due to capital controls. Since banking
activity ceases to be a veil (banks, as we will see, make prots in equilibrium), it is useful
for future reference to discuss the nature of competition between banks more specically.
Then, we assume that there is a set of incumbent banks engaging in a two-stage Bertrand
competition game. The total prots of the banking industry are transferred to the
government.30 For simplicity, throughout this section we restrict attention to equilibria
30This is for simplicity. We could alternatively assume that the prots accrue to a separate group,
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featuring a positive trade surplus, i.e., such that banks hold government bonds in their
portfolio.31
The following assumption describes more formally the competition between banks.
Assumption 2 Competition in the banking industry is described by the following two-
stage game: (stage i) banks compete ( à la Bertrand) in o¤ering rms lending contracts
specifying a loan size and an interest rate; (stage ii) banks compete ( à la Bertrand) in
o¤ering workers deposit contracts; (stage iii) if in stage ii all banks have raised su¢ cient
funds to honor stage i contracts, contracts are enforced; otherwise, no exchange take
place, and the game restarts from stage i.
The equilibrium characterization is simple. In the second stage, banks compete to
attract depositors. Since banks can earn the rate of return R on government bonds,
absent regulation, competition would drive the deposit rate up to R: However, due to
the ceiling on deposit rates, all banks will o¤er the maximum rate Rd: In the rst stage,
banks will choose a portfolio consisting of government bonds and loans to F rms, for
which they charge an interest rate Rl = R= (1  ).32 Charging a lower rate would be
suboptimal, since it would yield a net return lower than government bonds. Finally,
competition prevents banks from charging a higher rate of return on loans.
Consider the e¤ect of deregulating the deposit rate. The deposit rate would then
increase to R; and banksprots would vanish. There would be no e¤ect on the lending
rate, implying no general equilibrium e¤ect through wages. Households would enjoy
a higher rate of return on their savings. Depending on the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution for consumption, this might yield higher or lower savings. In the log case,
there is no e¤ect on the savings of the young. However, the higher rate of return increases
unambiguously the consumption of the old. Thus, the sole e¤ect of the deregulation is
a transfer from the government to the old consumers. Since the government neither
consumes nor invests, while the old consume all their income, the deregulation reduces
the trade surplus, at least as long as the savings rate does not increase too much in
response to the higher deposit rate (the trade surplus falls unambiguously in the case
the bankers, or that they are rebated to consumers as lump sums. Since the major Chinese banks are
state-owned, it makes sense to consolidate their prots with those of the government.
31Otherwise, banks would like to borrow from the government or from the foreign sector. However,
since capital controls forbid that, loans must equal deposits, as in the equilibrium of a neoclassical
closed-economy model. In this case, the interest rate on loans would be lower than R: We ignore this
case since China has a very large foreign surplus.
32As discussd above, China had a oor on lending rates, which was removed in July 2013. For
simplicity, we ignore such constraint, assuming that it is not binding.
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of logarithmic utility). In summary, the deregulation of deposit rates has no e¤ect on
the production side of the economy. In particular, it has no e¤ect on transition nor on
economic growth. The only macroeconomic e¤ect is a change (most likely, a decrease)
in the aggregate savings rate and in the net foreign position of China.
The comparative statics above hinges on the assumption that the regulation does
not a¤ect entry in the banking industry. In the model above, incumbent (in China,
state-owned) banks capture all deposits and make all loans. However, these banks are
ine¢ cient insofar as they do not lend to private rms. However, one might expect that
more competition would trigger the entry of di¤erent types of banks that are more prone
to lend to entrepreneurs. To explore this possibility, one we regard as highly realistic in
the Chinese institutional context, we expand the model and allow competition among
di¤erent types of banks. We distinguish between incumbent banks (behaving as described
above) and fringe banks. The latter are prepared to lend to private rms, either due to a
better monitoring technology, or due to better governance that makes them less biased
in favor of F rms. In China, this might capture the notion that fringe banks are private
rather than state owned. However, fringe banks have a small disadvantage in collecting
deposits: incumbents have a well-established network of branches and customers, which
makes it costly for fringe banks to attract depositors unless they o¤er higher rates. In
particular, we assume that savers would strictly prefer the deposits o¤ered by incumbent
banks at the rate Rd unless fringe banks o¤er at least Rd + ; where  > 0:
We model the lending behavior of fringe banks as follows. They can lend to F rms
and purchase government bonds at the same terms as do incumbent banks. In addition,
they can lend to E rms subject to a moral hazard constraint. Following SSZ, we assume
that entrepreneurs can pledge to repay a share  of the second-period net prots. The
parameter  can be interpreted as a productivity parameter in the production function
of fringe banks: the higher the banksmonitoring capability, the higher ; and the less
tight the borrowing constraint faced by entrepreneurs. Alternatively,  can be thought
of as an inverse measure of the capture of banks policy from special interests. For
instance, if banks are biased in favor of state-owned enterprises, this would be reected
in a smaller , i.e., less lending to private rms. Note that incumbents are a particular
case of fringe banks, with  =  = 0:
Assumption 3 The bank industry comprises two types of banks: "incumbent" and
"fringe" banks. The two types of banks di¤er in two dimensions:
1. Fringe banks have a disadvantage in attracting deposits. Let Rd denote the deposit
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rate o¤ered by incumbent banks. Then, fringe banks can attract deposits only if
they o¤er a deposit rate of at least Rd + ; where  > 0:
2. Fringe banks have an advantage in lending to private rms, parameterized by a
larger . Namely, entrepreneurs can pledge to repay a share  > 0 of the second-
period net prots when they borrow from fringe banks, while  = 0 for incumbent
banks.
Consider the optimal contract between fringe banks and entrepreneurs, when fringe
banks are active. The E rms capital stock comprises now not only the savings of young
entrepreneurs, but also the loans from fringe banks: kEt = sEt 1 + l
E
t 1. The borrowing
constraint of entrepreneurs yields: RllE    sE + lE : This constraint is binding as
long as  < Rl=, which we assume to be the case. Thus, the share of private investments
nanced through bank loans is
lE
lE + sE
=

Rl
: (14)
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the banking industry before
and after the deregulation reform in an environment comprising both incumbent and
fringe banks.
Proposition 1 (i) In a "pre-reform" equilibrium (with regulation): Incumbent banks
o¤er the ceiling deposit rate Rd and attract all savings from workers; they hold an asset
portfolio comprising loans to F rms (with an interest rate of Rl = R= (1  )) and
government bonds, both yielding a rate of return net of intermediation costs of R > Rd:
Fringe banks are not active.
(ii) In a "post-reform" equilibrium (with no regulation): Incumbent banks o¤er the de-
posit rate R and attract a positive share of the savings from workers; they hold an asset
portfolio comprising loans to F rms (with an interest rate of Rl = R= (1  )) and gov-
ernment bonds, both yielding a rate of return net of intermediation costs of R: Fringe
banks o¤er the deposit rate R+  and attract a positive share of the savings from work-
ers; they hold an asset portfolio comprising only loans to E rms with an interest rate
of Rl;e = (R + ) = (1  ) :
Proof. Pre-reform. In the second stage, no bank can o¤er deposit rates higher than
Rd: Suppose a deviant incumbent o¤ers a deposit rate lower than Rd. Then, it will
attract no customer. Fringe banks are unable to raise any funds: for any feasible deposit
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rate smaller or equal to Rd; consumers strictly prefer the deposits o¤ered by incum-
bent banks. In the rst stage, suppose a deviant incumbent bank o¤ers a lending rate
above R= (1  ) : Then, no rm will enter such a lending contract. A deviation below
R= (1  ) is also unprotable, since the deviant bank could increase its prots by in-
vesting in bonds and earning a net rate R: Fringe banks cannot o¤er any contracts since
they are unable to raise funds in the second stage.
Post-reform. In the second stage, a deviant incumbent (fringe) o¤ering a deposit rate
lower than R (R+ ) will attract no customers, whereas a deviant incumbent o¤ering a
deposit rate higher than R (R+ ) will make losses. In the rst stage, suppose a deviant
incumbent (fringe) bank o¤ers a lending rate above R= (1  ) ((R + ) = (1  )): A
deviation of an incumbent bank below R= (1  ) is also unprotable, since the deviant
bank could increase its prots by investing in bonds and earning a net rateR: A deviation
of a fringe bank below (R + ) = (1  ) is also unprotable, since the deviant bank is then
unable to raise funds for any interest rate below R+: Finally, at the equilibrium deposit
and lending rates both incumbent and fringe banks will be able to raise su¢ cient funds
to honour the lending contracts, since, at the equilibrium interest rates, the aggregate
demand of deposits exceeds the aggregate demand of loans.
A stark result of the proposition is that the regulation of deposit rates sties com-
petition in the banking industry, at the expense of the more productive E rms. In the
post-reform competitive equilibrium, all banksprots are driven to zero by competi-
tion. Incumbent banks set the deposit rate to R, and invest the resources collected in
government bonds and loans to F rms. Fringe banks set the deposit rate to R +  
the minimum rate required for them to attract customers and lend exclusively to E
rms, at an interest rate of (R + ) = (1  ) : In a deregulated economy, E rms still
face less favorable lending conditions, but fare better than under regulation, since they
can access external nancing.
In this environment, the deregulation of deposit rates has large e¤ects on productivity
and growth. A simple extension of the analysis in SSZ shows that the growth rate of
entrepreneurial capital, the key measure of the speed of economic transition, is given by:
KEt+1
KEt
= 1 + glib =
Rl;e
Rl;e   
 
1 +  

(1  ) Rl;e
Rl;e   
1 ! 1
 
1   


; (15)
where  = (1   ) 1  1  R= (1  ), and Rl;e = (R + ) = (1  ) is the rate at which
entrepreneurs can borrow from fringe banks, as long as these are active. The key pa-
rameter is ; a measure of the access of E rms to external nancing. KEt+1=KEt is
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increasing in ; and so are the growth rates of aggregate output and productivity. The
pre-reform equilibrium is a particular case of (15) where  = 0; hence:
KEt+1
KEt
= 1 + greg =
 
1 +  1 
 1  
1   


; (16)
which is the lower bound of the transition rate, given the other parameters.
The analysis so far has assumed that incumbent banks do not lend at all to entrepre-
neurs. From a descriptive standpoint it is more realistic to assume that all banks lend to
E rms, but that incumbent banks impose tighter borrowing constraints reecting their
bias against private rms. Formally, incumbent banks also lend to private rms, being
subject to a tighter constraint, 0 < ; than are fringe banks. In this case, incumbent
banks will lend to both F rms and E rms, whereas fringe banks will provide top-up
nancing to E rms, at higher lending rates.33
Corollary 1 Suppose incumbent banks also lend to E rms, but entrepreneurs can only
pledge a fraction 0 <  of their second-period prot when they borrow from incumbent
banks. Then, (i) In a "pre-reform" equilibrium (with regulation): Incumbent banks o¤er
the ceiling deposit rate Rd and attract all savings from workers; they hold an asset port-
folio comprising loans to F rms and E rms (with an interest rate of Rl = R= (1  )),
and government bonds, all yielding a rate of return net of intermediation costs of R > Rd:
Fringe banks are not active.
(ii) In a "post-reform" equilibrium (with no regulation): Incumbent banks o¤er the
deposit rate R and attract a positive share of the savings from workers; they hold
an asset portfolio comprising loans to F rms and E rms (with an interest rate of
Rl = R= (1  )), and government bonds, all yielding a rate of return net of intermedia-
tion costs of R: Fringe banks o¤er the deposit rate R+  and attract a positive share of
the savings from workers. They hold an asset portfolio comprising only of top-up loans
to E rms (i.e., loans in excess of the maximum nancing that E rms can get from
incumbent banks) with an interest rate of Rl;e = (R + ) = (1  ) :
The proof is a simple extension of the proof of Proposition 1 and is omitted. The
corollary shows that the main insights of Proposition 1 are robust to less extreme as-
sumptions.
33Note that we assume that all loans are observable. In addition, E-rmsloans with incumbent banks
have more seniority. Thus, if an E-rm collateralizes a share 0 of its future prot with an incumbent
bank, it can only collateralize an additional share    0 when it turns to a fringe bank for a top-up
loan.
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In summary, liberalizing the deposit market is likely to speed up privatization, pro-
ductivity, and growth. Before the liberalization, the entrepreneurial capital grows at the
constant rate greg, which dictates the rate of growth of employment in E rms and the
average growth rate of GDP. At the time of deregulation, the entrepreneurial capital
jumps upwards and, subsequently, continues to grow at a higher rate (glib) than be-
fore. The deregulation has no immediate e¤ect on wages. However, since deregulation
speeds up the transition, the time at which the transition ends (i.e., when all workers
are employed in E rms) will arrive earlier. Thus, so will the time when wage growth
accelerates (time T in Figure 11).
So far, we have considered only the e¤ects of a deregulation of interest rates on
deposits. However, China is considering a farther-reaching reform that should lead
to the full liberalization of cross-border investments. What would the e¤ect of such a
reform be? In our model, opening the capital account completely would have e¤ects that
are similar, and possibly stronger, than those of an internal deregulation. In particular,
foreign investors and intermediaries could introduce improvements equivalent to a further
increase in  or, possibly a reduction in the intermediation costs : This latter would
be the case if foreign entities could bring additional expertise, or if they could trigger
an increase in equity nancing. A reduction in  would have additional e¤ects. In
particular, it would increase lending to both E rms and F rms, and this, in turn,
would cause an increase in the capital-labor ratios of all rms and in wages.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we study the role of policy and nancial reforms in an environment char-
acterized by asymmetric nancial frictions and active controls on international capital
ows. We focus on exchange rate policy, interest rate policy, and the deregulation of in-
terest rate controls. We show that these policies interact with, and possibly strengthen,
the structural transformation of China analyzed in our previous work, characterized by
the high productivity growth and the accumulation of a foreign assets. In particular,
the policy interventions appear to have compressed wages and increased the wealth of
entrepreneurs, relaxing the borrowing constraints of private rms (see Itskhoki and Moll
2014 and Wang 2014 for related discussions of policy interventions in credit constrained
economies).
Contrary to a popular perception in the West, we do not argue that Chinas trade
surplus originates from policy interventions only. Our theory predicts that the imbal-
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ance is a natural outcome of the process of transformation under nancial constraints.
However, we show that activist exchange rate and monetary policies may have magni-
ed some of the e¤ects relative to the laissez-faire. As far as the exchange rate policy
is concerned, we document that the real exchange rate of China underwent a signicant
appreciation after 2006, following a period during which it was, arguably, undervalued.
Our theory predicts that the initial undervaluation, followed by a later realignment,
may have strengthened economic growth and contributed to the accumulation of foreign
assets in the mid-2000s. As for the real interest policy, we document that, although
the real return on savings has been signicantly lower in China than the stellar return
on real investments, the Chinese real deposit rate and the rate of return on domestic
bonds have been on average 0.9% higher than the rate on US T-bills. To the extent to
which this indicates that the BPOC has kept the interest rate higher than the world
rate, this policy has also contributed to economic growth and to the accumulation of
foreign reserves. Both policies have increased savings and reduced consumption.
In the second part of the paper, we study the e¤ect of a deregulation of deposit
rates as a vehicle of increasing competition in the domestic banking sector. China has
not yet made major reforms in this direction, but these are imminent, according to
the recent announcements of the PBOC. The government has also launched a new free
trade zone in the Shanghai area where o¤shore banking and capital transactions will
be heavily deregulated. We show that as long as liberalization reduces the bias of the
nancial system against small and medium private enterprises, nancial deregulation
will promote growth and reduce the trade surplus. The predictions of our theory are in
line with the empirical ndings of Fan and Kalemli-Ozcan (2014) who study the e¤ects
of nancial reforms on rm-level investments in a panel of Asian emerging economies.
They nd that nancial reforms reduce savings and increase investments in private rms
relative to state-owned rms, a pattern which conforms with the main mechanism of our
theory. These ndings further support our conviction that nancial reforms may become
a major engine of growth in future China.
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